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for target exploitation. One possibility, 
suggested by Dan Geer, is for the U.S. 
government (USG) to openly corner the 
vulnerability market.6 In particular, the 
USG would buy all vulnerabilities and 
share them with vendors and the public, 
offering to pay say 10 times as much as 
any competitor. Geer argues this strat-
egy will enlarge the talent pool of vulner-
ability finders, while also devaluing the 
vulnerabilities themselves. Assuming 
the supply of vulnerabilities is relatively 
sparse, the approach could eventually 
lead to a situation where most vulner-
abilities have been exposed and fixed, 
rendering any cyber weapons that ex-
ploited them useless. In addition, since 
researchers finding new zero-day will 
maximize their earnings by selling them 
to the USG, fewer zero-days should end 
up in the hands of adversaries.
The cost of Geer’s proposal seems 
reasonable. Current prices for vulner-
abilities range from a few hundred to 
several hundred thousand dollars. If 
we consider the approximately 8,000 
vulnerabilities added to the NVD in 
2014 and assume an average price 
of $1,000, then the cost of purchas-
L
A ST Y E A R ,  THE National Insti-
tute Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST) added 7,937 vul-
nerabilities to the National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD), 
up from 5,174 in 2013. That is approxi-
mately 22 per day, or almost one every 
hour. Of these, 1,912 (24%) were la-
beled “high severity” and 7,243 (91%) 
“high” or “medium.”7 Simply put, they 
cannot be ignored.
As I read reports of new vulnerabili-
ties and the risks they enable, I won-
der whether it will ever end. Will our 
software products ever be sufficiently 
secure that reports such as these are 
few and far between? Or, will they only 
become more prevalent as more and 
more software enters the market, and 
more dangerous as software increas-
ingly controls network-enabled medi-
cal devices and other products that 
perform life-critical functions?
In this column, I will explore two 
proposals aimed at reducing software 
flaws. The first, which involves the U.S. 
government cornering the vulnerabil-
ity market, I believe, could make the 
problem worse. However, the second, 
which involves holding companies lia-
ble for faulty software, is an idea whose 
time has come.
Cornering the Vulnerability Market
Many software companies, includ-
ing Microsoft, Google, and Mozilla, 
operate bug bounty programs, paying 
security researchers who bring new 
security flaws to their attention. Other 
companies serve as brokers, buying 
vulnerabilities and exploits from se-
curity researchers, and then selling 
or donating them to product vendors 
and other customers. To the extent the 
end consumers in this growing market 
are the companies whose products are 
flawed, the market serves to strengthen 
software security. But when end con-
sumers are intelligence agencies and 
criminals who use the information to 
exploit target systems, the vulnerabil-
ity market exposes us all to greater risk. 
To further reduce software vulner-
abilities beyond what the market has 
achieved so far, we could look for ways 
that encourage the pursuit of vulner-
abilities with the goal of getting them 
fixed, but discourage their sale and use 
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V than in patching flaws in deployed code that puts users at risk?Another issue is whether the USG would be willing to disclose all vulnera-bilities. Under current policy, software flaws it uncovers are generally to be dis-closed to vendors in order that they can be patched, but they can be kept secret and exploited when there is “a clear national security or law enforcement” reason.10 At the same time, it seems likely that many discovered vulnera-bilities will never reach the USG, being held for the purposes of exploitation by criminals and foreign governments. And many persons might simply op-
pose reporting them to the USG. 
Finally, vulnerability disclosure has 
the downside of increasing the risks 
of those using the reported products, 
at least until they can acquire and in-
stall the necessary patches. Consider 
ShellShock, a flaw in the UNIX Bourne-
again shell (Bash), which lets attackers 
remotely execute code or escalate privi-
leges. Disclosure of the flaw allowed 
attackers to harvest vulnerable com-
puters into a botnet that sent out over 
100,000 phishing email messages.3 A 
Symantec study found that attacks ex-
ploiting particular zero-day vulnerabil-
ities increased by as much as 100,000-
fold after their disclosure.2 
Software Liability
A better approach to reducing vulnera-
bilities would be to hold software com-
panies liable for damages incurred by 
cyber-attacks that exploit security flaws 
in their code. Right now, companies 
are not liable, protected by their licens-
ing agreements. No other industry en-
joys such dispensation. The manufac-
turers of automobiles, appliances, and 
other products can be sued for faulty 
products that lead to death and injury.
In Geekonomics, David Rice makes 
a strong case that industry incentives 
to produce secure software are inad-
equate under current market forces, 
and that one way of shifting this would 
be to hold companies accountable for 
faulty products.8 Geer proposes that 
software companies be liable for dam-
ages caused by commercial software 
when used normally, but that devel-
opers could avoid liability by deliver-
ing their software with “complete and 
buildable source code and a license 
that allows disabling any functional-
ing these vulnerabilities would be $8 
million, a drop in the bucket for the 
USG. Even if the average price rose to 
$100,000, the annual cost would still 
be reasonable at $800 million. How-
ever, the costs could become much 
higher and the problems worse if the 
program perversely incentivized the 
creation of bugs (for example, an in-
side developer colluding with an out-
side bounty collector).1 Costs could 
also rise from outrageous monetary 
demands or the effects of more people 
looking for bugs in more products. 
I especially worry that by shifting 
the cost from the private sector to the 
USG, companies would lose an eco-
nomic incentive to produce more se-
cure software in the first place. As it is, 
an empirical study by UC Berkeley re-
searchers of the bug bounty programs 
offered by Google and Mozilla for their 
respective browsers, Chrome and 
Firefox, found the programs were eco-
nomically efficient and cost effective 
compared to hiring full-time security 
researchers to hunt down the flaws.5 
Would it not be better to shift the in-
centives so it was more economical to 
invest in secure software development 
26    COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM    |   APRIL 2015  |   VOL.  58  |   NO.  4
viewpoints
Because software licenses and the 
Uniform Commercial Code severely lim-
it vendors from liability for security flaws 
in their code, companies today cannot 
be effectively sued or punished when 
they are negligent and the flaws are ex-
ploited to cause economic harm.9 Legis-
lation or regulation is needed to change 
this and remove the ability of companies 
to exempt themselves through licensing 
agreements. Developing a suitable li-
ability regime will be a challenge, how-
ever, as the system must address the 
concerns of both software developers 
and users. Perhaps a good start would 
be for ACM to sponsor a workshop that 
brings together a diverse community of 
stakeholders and domain experts to rec-
ommend a course of action.
Of course, holding software com-
panies accountable will not solve all 
our security woes. Many cyber-attacks 
exploit weaknesses unrelated to faulty 
software, such as weak and default 
passwords and failure to encrypt sen-
sitive information. But companies are 
liable when their systems are attacked, 
and they can be successfully sued for 
not following security standards and 
best practices. The time has come to 
make software vendors liable as well. 
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ity or code the licensee decides.”6 The 
escape clause, which would cover free 
and open source software, would allow 
users to inspect and cut out any soft-
ware they did not trust.
My main concern with Geer’s propos-
al relates to absolving any code offered 
commercially from liability. As a practi-
cal matter, very few users are in a posi-
tion to inspect source code. Even those 
that are can miss significant flaws, as 
seen with Heartbleed, a flaw in OpenS-
SL that gives attackers access to sensi-
tive information, and also ShellShock. 
In addition, exemption does nothing 
to incentivize the production of more 
secure open source code. At the same 
time, penalizing a large, volunteer com-
munity for flaws in their code would be 
both difficult and distasteful.
A better way around this dilemma 
might be to exempt the immediate de-
velopers of open source code, but hold 
accountable any company that embeds 
it in their products or that offers ser-
vices for open source products. Under 
such a provision, if an individual or 
group of volunteers offers a free, open 
source App, they would not be account-
able, though any company offering it 
through their App store would be.
This compromise would incentiv-
ize software companies to pay greater 
attention to security in all of the code 
they offer through their products and 
services, regardless of whether the 
code is developed in house, by a con-
tractor, or within the open source com-
munity; and regardless of whether the 
product is released with source code or 
the capability to disable certain func-
tions. Moreover, given that many com-
panies contribute to open source de-
velopment, they would be incentivized 
to promote secure coding practices in 
the open source community as well as 
within their own development teams.
Importantly, as with other forms of 
liability, software liability should be 
tied to standards and best practices, as 
well as the damage and harm that result 
from security flaws. The objective is not 
to penalize companies who invest con-
siderable resources in software security 
but find their code vulnerable to a new 
exploit that nobody had anticipated. 
Rather, it is to bring all software up to 
a higher level of security by punishing 
those who are negligent in this domain, 
for example, by putting out code that 
fails to check inputs. Standards and 
best practices for secure coding have ad-
vanced considerably, and readers inter-
ested in learning more might start with 
CERT’s Secure Coding Web portal.4  
The argument is often made that 
software liability will inhibit innovation, 
but we should inhibit the introduction 
of faulty software. Moreover, assigning 
liability will likely stimulate innovation 
relating to secure software develop-
ment. Another argument against soft-
ware liability is that it will raise the price 
of software. While this may be true, it 
should lower the costs we all pay from 
cyber-attacks that exploit software vul-
nerabilities, costs that have been rising 
over the years and fall on the backs of 
users as well as software companies.
Conclusion
Bug bounties emerged under current 
market forces and are likely here to 
stay. I oppose a program that would 
attempt to have the U.S. government 
corner and fund this market, in part 
because it would reduce the incentive 
for software companies to produce 
more secure code and could make the 
problem worse. 
A better strategy is one that increas-
es the incentives for the development 
of secure software but decreases those 
for putting out sloppy code. One way of 
achieving this is by holding companies 
responsible for all the code they sell 
and service, including both proprietary 
and open source. Under this strategy, 
companies could be sued for damages 
caused by cyber-attacks that exploited 
flaws in their code, and penalties would 
be inflicted according to whether the 
code was developed under standards 
and best practices for secure coding.
Developing a suitable 
liability regime  
will be a challenge,  
as the system must 
address the concerns 
of both software 
developers and users.
